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Bennett v. Spear: Lions, Tigers and Bears
Beware; The Decline of Environmental

Protection
INTRODUCTION

What would the world be, once bereft
Of wet and of wildness? Let them be left,
O let them be left, wildness and wet;
Long live the weeds and the wilderness yet.'

When Gerard Hopkins wrote these lines over a century ago, it is unlikely

he could have known how desperate his plea for environmental preservation
would become as the planet nears the twenty-first century.' While modern
industrial advances provide Americans with efficient, convenient, and even
luxurious lifestyles, it is the Earth that pays the all too often high price.' The
common denominator of every human life is the health of our planet. The
vulnerability of the environment is a stark, frightening, and supreme reality.
In response to the increasing need for environmental protection, Congress
enacted several statutes in the 1960s and 1970s designed to serve wideranging conservational purposes.' Among these newly enacted statutes was
1. GERARD MANLEY HOPKINs, INVERSNAID in IMMORTAL POEMS OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 460 (Oscar Williams ed., Washington Square Press 1952) (1882). In the poem,
Hopkins reflects upon the beauty of plants and animals. The nineteenth century poet expresses
both his fascination of nature and his desire that nature be preserved.
2. See Fen Osler Hampson & Judith Reppy, Environmentaland Social Change,ENv'T,
Apr. 1997, at 12, 13. Because of the build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the future
of the Earth's atmosphere is bleak. Id. In the upcoming century, the planet's climate will warm
on a global scale. Id. Moreover, currently leading to the extinction of plant and animal species,
are human activities like deforestation. Id. See also James Gustave Speth, An Environmental
Revolution in Technology, 24 ENVTL. SC. & TECH., 412, 413 (1990) (explaining that the need
to save humans from their assault on the Earth is urgent).
3. Speth, supra note 2, at 413. Environmental wreckage spanning from groundwater
to the atmosphere is accumulating at an overwhelming rate. Id. Among the many dangers
accosting the Earth are air pollution, global warming, and the depletion of the ozone layer. Id.
See Philip H. Abelson, Technology and Environment, 246 SCl. 429 (1989) (remarking that
urban air pollution, destruction of rain forests, and loss of habitat are difficult issues facing the
planet's future); see generally Jesse H. Ausubel, The Liberationof the Environment, DAEDALUS,
Summer 1996, at 1 (maintaining that at present, extreme environmental degradation exists);
Hampson, supra note 2, at 13 (expressing that considerable uncertainty exists regarding the
specific effects of global warming on ecological systems).
4. Among the environmental laws Congress enacted during the 1960s and 1970s are:
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (West 1980);

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18

the Endangered Species Act.5 The Act contained a relatively new legal
provision, called a citizen suit provision, that granted "persons" standing to
sue for enforcement of the Act.6 While this citizen suit provision was
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2692 (West 1998); Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-531 (West 1985); Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1465 (West 1985); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 1985); Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act
of 1974, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1614 (West 1985); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West 1986); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1445 (West 1986); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-26 (West 1991); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370 (West 1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901-6992k
(West 1995); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671(q) (West 1995); Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1785 (West 1986).
5. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998).
6. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g) (West 1985). See also Phillip M. Bender, Slowing the Net
Loss of Wetlands; Citizen Suit Enforcement of Clean WaterAct Section 404 Permit Violations,
27 ENVTL. L. 245, 263 (1997) (commenting that citizen suit provisions are fairly new to the
American legal system). The Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision states in relevant
part:
(g) Citizen suits
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any person may commence
a civil suit on his own behalf(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or
regulation issued under the authority thereof; or
(B) to compel the Secretary to apply, pursuant to section 1535(g)(2)(B)(ii) of this
title, the prohibition set forth in or authorized pursuant to section 1533(d) or
1538(a)(1)(B) of this title with respect to the taking of any resident endangered
species or threatened species within any State; or
(C) against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform
any act or duty under section 1533 of this title which is not discretionary with the
Secretary.
The concept of a citizen suit provision was introduced in 1970 in a book by Joseph L. Sax. Peter
H. Lehner, The Efficiency of Citizen Suits, ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK, Fall 1995, at 4; see also
JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1970). Sax
asserted that financial and political forces weakened the enforcement of environmental laws by
governmental agencies. Id. Hence, Sax maintained that citizens should be allowed to sue those
who harm natural resources and those who act in violation of environmental laws. Sax, supra, at
110-12. Citizen suit provisions equip citizens with the ability to enforce environmental laws
instead of the government. Lehner, supra,at 4. As one commentator summarized, citizen suits put
"'teeth into public participation."' Id. at 6. In addition, these provisions provide supplemental
enforcement particularly when governmental agencies have failed to conscientiously fulfill their
enforcement responsibilities. Bender, supra, at 263. In 1970, the Federal Clean Air Act enacted
the first major citizen suit provision. Lehner, supra, at 4.; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a) (West
1995). Since the Clean Air Act, citizen suit provisions have been incorporated into most major
environmental laws. Lehner, supra, at 5. Such enactments, demonstrate Congressional intent to
promote citizen enforcement of environmental laws. See Elizabeth Monohan & Brian Wright,
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman: Disputes Over Timber Removal From National
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intended to be a tool with which environmentalists could protect the
environment,7 the Supreme Court in Bennett v. Spear8 permitted a commercial
entity that claimed over-regulation to sue under the Act's citizen suit
provision.9
This note examines the Bennett v. Spear decision. Part I offers a brief
history of the progression and development of standing, both generally and
with respect to federal environmental statutes. Part 1Iaddresses the facts and
procedural posture of Bennett'° and discusses the Supreme Court's opinion.
Part II also includes the author's analysis of the opinion. Part I ponders
various means by which to restore environmental protection as a national
priority. Finally, this Comment concludes that the Bennett holding runs
contrary to the conservationist purposes of the Endangered Species Act and
other environmental laws containing analogous citizen suit provisions.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

THE PROGRESSION OF STANDING: GENERALLY

Article I of the United States Constitution sets out several principles
which in part restrict the Supreme Court's ability to hear a case by limiting the
jurisdiction of federal courts." Article III of the Constitution confines federal
courts to the adjudication of actual "cases" and "controversies. '" Included
in this case-or-controversy doctrine is the Article III requirement that a litigant
have "standing" to invoke the power of a federal court. 3 Essentially, the issue
Forests, 12 J.NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 189 (1996-97).

7. See Lehner, supra note 6, at 4.
8. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
9. Id. at 1162. For detailed discussion of Bennett, see infra pp. 560-65 and
accompanying notes.
10. Id. at 1154.
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III states that "[t]he judicial Power shall

extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United

States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies

between two or more States;-between Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,

and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." Id.
12. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-486 (1982). The Supreme Court also noted that Article III limits
the judiciary to a role that is consistent with separation of powers. Id. at 472.
13. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). The Allen Court opined that the
standing requirement was likely the most important part of the Article III requirements. Id.
Furthermore, standing involves many judicially self-imposed restrictions of the exercise of
federal jurisdiction. Id. at 751. Included among these restrictions are the prohibition of a
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of standing focuses mostly on the litigant asserting the claim by questioning
whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
dispute or of particular issues.14 Determining whether a litigant has standing
involves an inquiry not only of constitutional limitations on federal court
jurisdiction, but also of prudential limitations on the exercise of such
jurisdiction. 5 Constitutionally, standing involves justiciability because it
addresses the question whether the plaintiff has "alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy" as to warrant the invocation of federal
court jurisdiction. 6 The Court, however, recognizes limits on the class of
persons who may invoke the federal courts' powers. For instance, the Court
has held that when the harm asserted is a "generalized grievance" shared
equally by a large class of citizens, federal court jurisdiction is not
warranted. 7
Over time, the Supreme Court's decisions developed three elements
necessary to establish the constitutional minimum of standing.' The first
requirement is that the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact."' 9
"Injury in fact" is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is composed
of two parts.2" First, the invasion must be both concrete and particularized. 2'

plaintiff asserting another person's rights and the barring of generalized grievances. Id. (citing
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75). For brief discussion of generalized grievances, see infra
notes 17 and 27.
14. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The Warth Court declared that the
standing inquiry was the "threshold question in every federal case." Id.
15. Id. Both constitutional and prudential limitations on federal court jurisdiction are
rooted not only in concerns about the appropriate role of courts in a democratic society, but also
in the appropriate limitations on that role. Id. (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 221-27 (1974)).
16. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The Supreme Court succinctly
commented that the inquiry regarding whether the plaintiff alleged a personal stake in the case
was essentially "the gist of the question of standing." Id. It is this personal stake in the outcome
that enhances the presentation of issues necessary to properly resolve constitutional questions.
Id.
17. Schlesinger,418 U.S. at 221. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 18897 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring). In Schlesinger, plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of all United
States citizens and taxpayers. Id. at 208. The Court held that plaintiffs failed to establish a
nexus between their injury and their claim. Id. The Court explained that concrete injury is a
necessary foundation upon which the Court may base its decision. Id. at 221. It is this concrete
injury that enables a litigant to authoritatively present to a court the facts that sparked his/her
grievance. Id. Such a perspective is thereby not a generalized grievance that is barred by the
Court. See id.
18. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). For brief discussion of
Lujan, see infra pp. 558-59 and nn.40-42.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Warth, 422 U.S. at 508 (citing Schlesinger,418 U.S. at 221-222). See Allen, 468
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Second, the invasion of a legally protected interest must be actual or imminent
and not conjectural or hypothetical.22 The second requirement to establish
standing is that there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
contested conduct. 23 In other words, the injury must be fairly traceable to the
defendant's challenged action and not the result of an independent action by
an outside party not before the court. 24 Finally, the third requirement is that
it must be likely and not simply speculative that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision of the court.25
The Supreme Court's rules on standing are a blend of Article III case-orcontroversy requirements and prudential considerations.26 Such prudential
considerations are self-imposed limits on the judiciary regarding the exercise
of federal jurisdiction.27 The primary distinction between Article Ell
requirements and prudential considerations with respect to standing is that
Article ]II requirements may not be overridden by either the Supreme Court
or Congress because they are prescribed by the Constitution.2" However,
prudential considerations may be overridden by the, Supreme Court or
Congress.2 9

U.S. at 756. In Warth, the Court expressed that without the necessary particularized injury,
there is no reason to exercise judicial review of the case. Id.
22. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983).
23. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
24. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
25. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 38.
26. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
27. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. Among the prudential considerations to which the Court
adheres is that a plaintiff must assert his/her own legal rights and interests and cannot base
his/her claim on third party rights or interests. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. In addition, the Court
will not hear generalized grievances which consist of "abstract questions of wide public
significance." Id. at 499-500. The Court has further required that the plaintiff s complaint fall
within the "zone of interests" which the statute or constitutional guarantee is designed to protect
or regulate. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
For brief discussion of the Camp ruling and the zone of interests test, see infra p. 558 and
nn.30-34.
28. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. The Allen Court noted that the standing requirement derives
its core components directly from the Constitution. Id. The Court further noted that like
prudential considerations, constitutional standing components are difficult to precisely define.
Id. However, legal notions of standing have gained more definition from developing case law
in this area. Id.
29. Camp, 397 U.S. at 154.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF STANDING AFFECTING FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES

The most relevant of the three basic prudential considerations," came in
1970 when the Supreme Court first introduced the "zone of interests" test.31
In Association of Data ProcessingService Organizationsv. Camp,32 the Court

reviewed a challenge brought under the Administrative Procedure Act 33 and
maintained that such prudential requirements may be waived by Congress.34
Two years later, the Supreme Court addressed whether a change in the
aesthetics and ecology of an area constituted injury-in-fact in the original

environmental standing case, Sierra Club v. Morton.35 The Court held that

such harm may amount to an injury-in-fact,3 6 but the plaintiff bringing suit
must be among the injured.37
Two decades after SierraClub,38 the Supreme Court addressed a standing
question in a suit brought under a citizen suit provision of the Endangered

30. See supra text accompanying note 27.
31. The Court asserted that prudential considerations did not bear on the merits of the
case, but instead on "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question." Camp, 397 U.S. at 153. The Court elaborated on the "zone of interests" prudential
consideration by asserting that such interests may at times reflect not only economic values, but
"aesthetic, conservation, and recreational" values as well. Id. at 154 (quoting Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FCC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965)).
32. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV 1964). This provision of the Administrative Procedure
Act grants standing to a person wronged by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153. In Camp, plaintiffs sued under the Administrative Procedure
Act to challenge a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. at 151.
34. Camp, 397 U.S. at 154. The Camp Court asserted that although Congress may not
override Article III standing requirements, it may deem prudential limitations inapplicable. Id.
The Court further elaborated that where statutes are at issue, the movement in standing law is
to enlarge the class of people who would be allowed to challenge administrative action. Id.
35. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In Sierra Club, Sierra Club alleged a non-economic injury
by instead asserting injury to the aesthetics and ecology of a national park. Id. at 734.
36. Id. The Sierra Club Court added that "environmental well-being" is similar to
economic well-being because both are "important ingredients of the quality of life in our
society." Id. Furthermore, the trend of cases arising under statutes that authorize judicial
review of federal agency action has been toward acknowledging that non-economic injuries are
considered injury-in-fact with respect to standing. Id. at 738.
37. Id. at 734-35. The Court maintained that injury-in-fact requires more than an
"injury to a cognizable interest." Id. This requirement in an environmental context generally
means a plaintiff must demonstrate that his use of the area will be affected by the challenged
action. Id. at 735. Although the trend in case law is to enlarge the class of people who may
challenge an action by broadening the types of injuries that may be alleged, this is different from
discarding the injury-in-fact requirement entirely. Id. at 738. See supra notes 34, 36 and
accompanying text.
38. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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Species Act.3 9 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,' the Court reaffirmed the
role of irreducible constitutional minimum standing requirements.4"
Moreover, the Lujan Court held that a citizen suit provision could not create
in people an abstract, blanket power with which to command the Executive
branch's adherence to certain procedures.42
Two years later in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapterof Communitiesfor a
Great Oregon,43 the Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to
apply the zone of interests prudential consideration" by determining whether
plaintiffs who were contesting the wording of an Endangered Species Act
provision represented interests that the Act was designed to protect.45
However, in Babbitt46 the court failed to even address a standing issue.
In 1997, the Supreme Court once again faced an opportunity to apply the
"zone of interests" consideration on a standing issue brought under the
Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision47 in Bennett v. Spear.48
Unfortunately, the Bennett decision negated the zone of interests prudential
test in an effort to enlarge the class of persons who may bring suit in this
environmental law context.

39. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g) (West 1985). For detailed discussion of the history and
purpose of citizen suit provisions in environmental statutes, see supra note 6.

40. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
41. Id. at 560. The Court highlighted the three minimum constitutional standing
requirements which are: plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact; causal connection must
exist between plaintiff's injury and the challenged conduct; plaintiff's injury must likely be
redressable by a favorable decision. Id. at 560-61. See supra pp. 556-57 and accompanying
notes for detailed discussion of these standing requirements.
42. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573. The Lujan Court rejected the lower court's view by
asserting that citizen suit provisions cannot give to all persons an "abstract, self-contained,
noninstrumental 'right' to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law." Id. The
Court explained that such a right would violate separation of powers because it would transfer
the President's most important constitutional duty of executing the laws to the judiciary. Id. at
577. As a result, Congress through the enactment of such citizen suit provisions would be
permitting the Courts to "assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another
and co-equal department." Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477, 489 (1923)).
43. 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995).
44. For discussion of zone of interests prudential requirement, see supra p. 558 and
accompanying notes.
45. The plaintiffs included small landowners, logging companies, families dependent
on forest products industries in the Pacific Northwest and in the Southeast, and organizations
that represented their interests. Babbitt, 115 S. Ct. at 2410.
46. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
47. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g) (West 1985).
48. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997). For detailed discussion of Bennett, see pp. 560-65 and
accompanying notes.
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f1. BENNETT V. SPEAR4 9
A.

CASE FACTS AND HISTORY

In 1992, the federal Bureau of Reclamation notified the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service that the ongoing operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project' °
in Oregon might affect two endangered species of fish.5 The U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service prepared a biological opinion52 that recommended maintaining a minimum water level. 3 Accepting the biological opinion's recommendations, the Bureau of Reclamation informed the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service that it would operate in compliance with the recommendations.54

49.
50.

117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
The Klamath Irrigation Project is one of the oldest federal reclamation schemes that

consists of a series of lakes, rivers, dams and irrigation canals in northern California and
southern Oregon. Id. at 1159. In accordance with the Reclamation Act of 1902 and the Act of
Feb. 9, 1905, the Secretary of the Interior undertook the project. Id. For text of Reclamation
Act of 1902, see 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 371-600b (West 1986). The Klamath Irrigation Project is
under the Secretary's jurisdiction and thus, the Secretary administers it. Id.
51. Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1154(1997). The Bureau
of Reclamation concluded that the long term operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project might
harm the Lost River (Deltistes luxatus) and Shortnose Suckers (Chasmistes brevirostris) species.
Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159. The two species of fish were listed as endangered in 1988. Id. See
53 Fed. Reg. 27,130-27,133 (1988).
52. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159. After consulting with the Bureau of Reclamation, the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service issued the biological opinion in accordance with 50 C.F.R. §
402.14 (1995). Id. This section of the Code of Federal Regulations states that "[e]ach Federal
agency shall review its actions at the earliest possible time to determine whether any action may
affect listed species or critical habitat. If such a determination is made, formal consultation is
required... The Director may request a Federal agency to enter into consultation if he identifies
any action of that agency that may affect listed species or critical habitat and for which there has
been no consultation. When such a request is made, the Director shall forward to the Federal
agency a written explanation of the basis for the request." 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (1997). The
opinion concluded that the Klamath Project could jeopardize the fish's existence and identified
"reasonable and prudent alternatives" that the Service recommended to avoid harm to the fish.
Id. For brief discussion of one of these alternatives, see infra note 53.
53. Id. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service concluded in its biological opinion that the
water in Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs, the two reservoirs in question, should be maintained
at a minimum level. Id. The opinion stated that unless such mitigating actions were taken, it
was likely that the Lost River and Shortnose Suckers would be adversely affected. Bennett, 63
F.3d at 915.
54. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159.
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Two Oregon irrigation districts55 sued the director and regional director
of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service56 and the Secretary of the Interior.5 7 In
part, the complaint alleged that the government violated the Endangered
Species Act5" because it failed to consider the economic impacts of the

minimum water levels.59

At the District Court trial, the irrigation districts' complaint was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.'" The court concluded that the irrigation
districts lacked standing. 6
On appeal, the irrigation districts claimed that their action was not
precluded by the zone of interests test.62 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the complaint's dismissal.6 3 The court concluded that the
55. The two Oregon irrigation districts received Klamath Project water. Id. Brad
Bennett of the Langell Valley Irrigation District and Mario Giordano of the Horsefly Irrigation
District, the two operators of ranches within those districts, filed the cause of action. Bennett,
63 F.3d at 915.
56. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 915. The director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was
John F. Turner. Id. In addition, the regional director for the Service was Marvin L. Plenert.
Id.
57: Id. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior who was named as a party
was Bruce Babbitt. Id. The petitioners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief to force the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to withdraw portions of the biological opinion. Id. at 916.
Petitioners' complaint alleged that evidence to support the opinion's conclusion that the fish
would be jeopardized by the Klamath Irrigation Project was lacking. Id. Petitioners went on
to explain in their complaint that they were challenging the minimum water levels in order to
ensure the availability of water for their own commercial uses. Id.
58. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(b)(2) (West 1985).
59. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160. The petitioners' complaint included two other claims
for relief on grounds that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's determination that the fish would
be harmed by the Klamath Project and the resulting imposition of minimum water levels
violated §7 of the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 1160. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (West 1985).
In addition, petitioners brought related claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (West 1996), and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(C) (West 1994). Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160. See id. n.l. The
Administrative Procedure Act authorizes a court to set aside agency actions, findings, and
conclusions that are found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law. Id. at 1167; see also 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West 1996). The
Administrative Procedure Act also provides a right to judicial review of all final agency action
when a court provides no other proper remedy. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a) (West 1996).
60. Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1160.
61. Id. The district court held that the Oregon irrigation districts' right in using the
Klamath Irrigation Project water for commercial and recreational purposes opposed the Lost
River and Shortnose Suckers' interest in using the water for its habitat. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 917.
The court further explained that the two Oregon irrigation districts did not have standing
because their "'recreational, aesthetic, and commercial interests ... do not fall within the zone
of interests sought to be protected by ESA."' Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160 (quoting App. to Pet.
for Cert. 28).
62. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 917.
63. Id. at 922.
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zone of interests test limits the class of persons who may obtain judicial
review under the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act.'
Moreover, the court remarked that to fall within the zone of interests protected

by the Act, plaintiffs must allege an interest in the preservation of endangered
species.65 Bennett petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Certiorari-was
granted. 66
B.

THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding.67 By
a unanimous 9-0 decision, the Court concluded that the irrigation districts'
claims under the Engendered Species Act were not precluded by the zone of
68
interests test.
64. Id. at 919. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g) (West 1985). For complete text of the
Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision, see supra note 6. The Appellate Court
remarked that it has consistently used the zone of interest test in determining the standing of
plaintiffs suing under citizen suit provisions. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 919. The court further
explained that simply because a statute contains a citizen suit provision does not automatically
establish that Congress intended any plaintiff to have standing to assert a violation of that
particular statute. Id. As a result, the court concluded that the Endangered Species Act's citizen
suit provision does not immediately confer standing on every plaintiff who both satisfies the
Article III constitutional requirements and claims a violation of the Act's procedures. Id. The
court determined the overall purpose of the Act by considering the Supreme Court's review of
the Endangered Species Act in Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978), and
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2413
(1995). Id. at 920. In those cases, the Supreme Court pointed out that the Act's Congressional
intent was to reverse the trend toward species extinction. Id.
65. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 919. The court asserted that only plaintiffs alleging an interest
in the preservation of endangered species fall within the zone of interests which the Endangered
Species Act protects. Id. According to the court, to permit otherwise by allowing plaintiffs to
sue even when their purposes were inconsistent with the Endangered Species Act or only
slightly related to the purpose of the Act, would be "plainly inconsistent" with the purpose of
the Act. Id.
66. Bennett, 117 S.Ct. 1160.
67. Id. at 1169.
68. The Court explained that the scope of the zone of interests varies according to the
provisions of the law at issue. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1161. As a result, what comes within the
zone of interests when judicially reviewing administrative action in one instance may not apply
in another instance. Id. The Court further declared that that the Endangered Species Act's
citizen suit provision, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g) (West 1985), both negated the zone ofinterests
test and expanded the zone of interests. Id. at 1162. For partial text of the Endangered Species
Act's citizen suit provision, see supra note 64. The Court noted that the Act's citizen suit
provision, constituted "an authorization of remarkable breadth" when compared with the
language Congress used in other environmental and non-environmental statutes. Id. With
respect to non-environmental citizen suit provisions, suit was both authorized and limited by
using language such as "[any person injured in his business or property" or only by
"competitors, customers, or subsequent purchasers." Id. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2305(c) (West
1988); see 7 U.S.C.A. § 298(b) (West 1980); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 72 (West 1997).
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The.Court began its analysis by determining whether the zone of interests
test applied to the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision. 69 By
reviewing its prior standing decisions, the Court summarized Article I's
"irreducible constitutional minimum" case or controversy standards. 70 In
addition to these Article HI requirements, the Court outlined prudential
principles that affect standing issues, including the zone of interests test.7'
The Court noted that the scope of the zone of interests varies depending on the
statute at issue.72

The Court then addressed the issue of whether the Endangered Species

Act's citizen suit provision negates the zone of interests test.73 The Court
69. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. 1160; see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g) (West 1985). For
relevant text of the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision, see supra note 6.
70. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 116 1. The Court noted that the question of standing involves
"both constitutional limitations of federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its
exercise." Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), citing Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953)). The Bennett Court highlighted the Article III case or controversy
requirements that a plaintiff must demonstrate. Id. These requirements are: injury in fact, injury
that is traceable to the actions of the defendant, and injury that will likely be redressed by a
favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992), cited in
Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1161. For more detailed discussion of these Article III case or
controversy requirements, see supra pp. 555-56 and accompanying notes 11-17.
71. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1161. The Court maintained that federal courts have also
"adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing." Id. (quoting
Valley Forge,454 U.S. at474-75). Such principles are self-imposed by the judiciary and limit
the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, cited with approvalin Bennett, 117
S. Ct. at 1161. Prudential considerations originated from concerns regarding the appropriate
and properly limited role of the judiciary in a democracy. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498, cited with
approval in Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1161. The Bennett Court identified and explained "zone of
interests" as such a prudential consideration. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1161. The Court reiterated
that under the zone of interests test, a plaintiff's grievance must arguably fall within the zone
of interests either protected or regulated by the relevant statutory or constitutional provision that
is the subject of the suit. Id. For more detailed discussion of prudential considerations
including "zone of interests," see supra p. 557 and text accompanying notes 26-29.
72. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1161. The Bennett Court further explained that what comes
within the zone of interests under one statute may not necessarily do so under other statutes.
Id. The Court also added that unless this zone of interests test is expressly negated, Congress
legislates based on this prudential principle. Id. at 1162.
73. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162. Contrasting the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit
provision against more restrictive provisions of other environmental statutes, the Court asserted
that the Act's provision was remarkably unlimited, particularly in comparison to the language
Congress normally uses. Id. While the Endangered Species Act says that "any person may
commence a civil suit," other environmental statutes use more restrictive formulations like "[any
person] having an interest which is or may be adversely affected," "[a]ny person suffering legal
wrong," or "any person having a valid legal interest which is or may be adversely affected...
whenever such action constitutes a case or controversy." Id.; see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g)
(West 1985); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(g) (West 1986); Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1270(a) (West 1986); Energy Supply and Environmental
Coordination Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 797(b)(5) (West 1997); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion
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concluded that the zone of interests prudential consideration was negated.7 4
Based upon two interrelated considerations, the Court expanded standing
through such negation.75 The first consideration was that the environment is
the general subject matter of the Act and such an area is one in which
everyone has an interest.76 The second consideration was that the purpose of
the citizen suit provision is to encourage enforcement by citizens.77 The Court
reasoned that its expansion of standing served both these considerations.7"
When determining whether the petitioners had standing to bring suit
under the Administrative Procedure Act,79 the Bennett Court asserted that such
a determination is made by reference to the particular provision of law upon
which the plaintiff relies rather than by reference to the overall purpose of the
act in question which here is the Endangered Species Act.80
In closing, the Court held that none of the petitioners' claims were
precluded by the zone of interests test. 8' The Court further concluded that one
of the petitioners' claims under the Endangered Species Act was reviewable
under the Act's citizen suit provision. 2 Lastly, the Court concluded that the
petitioners' remaining claims were reviewable under the Administrative

Act 42 U.S.C.A. § 9124(a) (West 1995). Moreover, select non-environmental statutes
concerning unfair trade practices and similar business matters also use more restrictive
formulations. Id.; see also 7 U.S.C.A. § 2305(c) (West 1988); 15 U.S.C.A. § 72 (West 1997);
15 U.S.C.A. § 298(b) (West 1997). For relevant text of these more restrictive formulations, see
supra note 68.
74. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The Court stated that the "obvious purpose" of the citizen suit provision was
to encourage enforcement by "private attorneys general." Id. As support for its assertion
regarding the provision's purpose, the Court cited: the provision's elimination of the amount
in controversy and diversity of citizenship requirements, the Act's provision for recovery of
litigation costs including expert witness fees, and the Act's reservation to the government of a
right of first refusal to initially pursue the action plus a right to intervene later. Id. The Court
admitted its awareness that the Act's citizen suit provision favored environmentalists because
it includes all private violations of the Act. Id. at 1163. However, the Court added that no
textual basis existed for proclaiming that its expansion of standing requirements applied only
to environmentalists. Id.
78. Id. at 1162.
79. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-596 (West 1996).
80. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1167.
81. Id. at 1169.
82. Id.; see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g) (West 1985).

BENNETT V. SPEAR

1998]

Procedure Act 3 and reversed the Ninth Circuit decision.84 The case was
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Bennett opinion.85
C.

ANALYSIS

For the first time in its history, the Supreme Court ruled on who has
rights to use the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act. 6 By
granting standing to a commercial entity, the Bennett Court demonstrated its
intent to expand standing.8" In doing so, the Court provided precedent to
lower courts when determining standing under the Endangered Species Act's
citizen suit provision.88 The first of three main impacts of Bennett is that the
broad expansion in standing under the Act will likely result in an increase in
litigation brought by commercial entities that claim the Act over-regulates
them. 9

83. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-596 (West 1996). For brief discussion regarding rights under
the Administrative Procedure Act, see supra note 59.
84. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1169.
85. Id.
86. Diance R. Smith, Noel Davis & Mari Schroeder, High Court Levels Playing Field
for Developers, Ranchers, Others, ENvTL COMPLIANCE & LImG. STRATEGY, Apr. 1997, at 1.
The Bennett Court interpreted the terms "any person" in the citizen suit provision of the
Endangered Species Act to include all persons because everyone has an interest in the
environment. Id. For detailed discussion of the Bennett holding, see pp. 562-65 and
accompanying notes.
87. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1167.
88. Murray D. Feldman, Bennett v. Spear: Supreme Court Confirms Standing to
Challenge Excessive Government Regulation Under EndangeredSpecies Act, ADVOC., June
1997, at 20, 23. The expansive, permissive standing granted by the Supreme Court provides
precedent that will be similarly and equally applied to future claims brought by both
environmental and commercial interests. Id. See generally Landowners Get Win on Species
Act: Supreme Court Opens Door to Lawsuits, Cai. TRIB., Mar. 20, 1997, at 6 (remarking that
lower courts had granted standing under the Endangered Species Act only to plaintiffs seeking
to protect the preservation of species) [hereinafter Landowners Get Win on Species Act].
89. Feldman, supra note 88, at 22. The Supreme Court essentially invites resource
development interests to file challenges that contest regulations under the Endangered Species
Act. Id. See Mark Hansen, Angling for a Right to Sue, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 22; Linda
Greenhouse, Nature GuardiansNot Exemptfrom Suits: Court Says Either Side in Preservation
FightMay Bring Action, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 20, 1997, at A10, availablein 1997 WL
3123408; High Court May Hear Challenge to the EndangeredSpecies Act, SAN DIEGo UNION
TRMi., Nov. 11, 1996, at A5, available in 1996 WL 12575617; Landowners Get Win on Species
Act, supra note 88, at 6. Most potential commercial plaintiffs had been discouraged from
bringing suit because the standing rule "was a hurdle they could not jump." Landowners Get
Win on Species Act, supra note 88, at 6. However, more suits will now be brought. Id. In
addition, the Bennett Court's decision generates an increased likelihood that commercial
challenges to agency actions will be successful. Smith, supra note 86, at 3.
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Second, the Bennett holding will likely influence future cases involving
other environmental laws containing a similar citizen suit provision.9" The
primary effect is that Bennett9' may encourage more suits challenging
regulations under similar environmental laws.92
Finally, the Bennett decision shifts the focus of environmental statutes
like the Endangered Species Act away from environmental interests to those
of commerce.93 This shift does not enforce the true purpose of the Endangered
Species Act94 because it permits commercial interests to sue pursuant to a
statute intended to protect the environment.9 The Supreme Court's negation

90. Smith, supra note 86, at 3. See U.S. Supreme Court May Have Difficult Time
Ruling in Bennett v. Spear, W. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 15, 1997, availablein 1996 WL 659849.
Cf. In the U.S. Supreme Court: the First Environmental Standing Case since Lujan II, W.
LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 13, 1997, available in 1996 WL 658551 (suggesting that the Bennett

decision may provide answers to unresolved standing questions in other environmental statutes).
91. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
92.

Hansen, supra note 89, at 22. See Greenhouse, supra note 89, at AIO (commenting

93.

Landowners Get Win on Species Act, supra note 88, at 6. The Supreme Court's

that other federal environmental laws like the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Safe
Drinking Water Act will now be available to plaintiffs seeking to challenge such regulations).
holding will assist landowners, developers, and property rights advocates who have long
disliked federal environmental laws. Id. These groups' resentment of environmental laws stems
from their contention that regulating agencies often over-step their authority and inflict needless
economic harm upon landowners and developers in an effort to protect endangered species. Id.
Furthermore, the Bennett decision focuses on the need to protect commercial interests from
governmental over-regulation under the Endangered Species Act. Feldman, supra note 88, at
23. Such a stance constitutes a notable change from the Supreme Court's position in its first
case involving the Endangered Species Act, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978). See Feldman, supra note 88, at 23. In that case, the Court stated that the congressional
intent of the Endangered Species Act was to "halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost." TVA, 437 U.S. at 172-173 (emphasis added). As one observer
noted, the "Bennett decision is yet another part of continuing judicial... [effort] to temper the
application of what is generally considered one of the strongest federal environmental laws."
Feldman, supra note 88, at 23.
94. The purposes of the Endangered Species Act are in part, "to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved" and "to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and
threatened species." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b) (West 1985). The purpose of the Act was based
upon Congressional findings that various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United
States had become extinct because of economic growth that was "untempered by adequate
concern and conservation." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a)(1) (West 1985). Moreover, these
Congressional findings stated that the numbers of other species of fish, wildlife, and plants in
the United States were being reduced in such a manner that they were in danger of becoming
extinct. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a)(2) (West 1985). Finally, Congress also found that these species
harbor "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the
Nation and its people." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a)(3) (West 1985).
95. Brennan Cain, Bennett v. Spear: Did CongressIntendfor the EndangeredSpecies
Act's Citizen-SuitProvision to be One Size Fits All?, 20 ENVIRONS ENVTL L. & POL'Y J. 2, 3
(1997). See Sheldon K. Rennie, Bennett v. Plenert, Using the Zone-of-Interests Test to Limit
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96
of the zone of interests test simplifies standing requirements under the Act,
expands standing to commercial groups,97 and thereby effectively stalls the
Act's stated purpose of environmental protection.
By interpreting the "any person" language of the Endangered Species
Act's citizen suit provision to include everyone,98 the Supreme Court in
°
Bennett" operated contrary to general statutory construction principles." The
first statutory construction principle that the Court disregarded in its holding
°
is that of interpretation in accordance with legislative intent or purpose."
According to this rule, the court should construe a statute based upon its

Standing Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 7 VII.. ENVTL L.J. 375, 399 (1996). The purpose

of the citizen suit provision was to equip citizens to become "private attorneys general" and
assist in the enforcement of the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 14. However, industry plaintiffs
like those in Bennett frustrate the purpose of the statute. Id. at 14. For further discussion of
environmental protection as the Endangered Species Act's purpose, see supra note 94.
96. The zone of interests test requires that a plaintiffs grievance fall within the zone
of interests either protected or regulated by the relevant statutory or constitutional provision that
is the subject of the suit. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153. For discussion of the Camp holding, see
supra p. 558 and nn.30-4. By negating this prudential test, the Bennett Court expanded standing
and enlarged the class of persons able to bring suit under the Endangered Species Act because
standing requirements were easier for potential plaintiffs to meet. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 116263. The Court opined that the environment was a matter in which everyone has an interest. Id.
Therefore, the Court reasoned that everyone falls within the zone of interests which the
Endangered Species Act was designed to protect. Id. For further, more detailed discussion of
the Bennett Court's treatment of the zone of interests test, see supra pp. 563-64 and
accompanying notes.
97. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1169.
98. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162. For detailed discussion of the Court's finding
regarding the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision, see supra pp. 563-64 and nn.7378.
99. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
100. Among the general principles of statutory construction that the Court failed to
utilize are interpretation based upon legislative purpose and what the author will refer to as the
"whole construction rule." For a more detailed discussion of both rules, see infra pp. 567-68
and accompanying notes.
101. EARLT. CRAwFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 160, at 246 (1940). See
id. § 161, at 247. The legislature's intent is the core of the law and constitutes the law. Id. §
160, at 246. In addition, the reason why the law was passed by the legislature is the legislative
purpose. Id. § 161, at 247. It is this legislative purpose that serves as "the touchstone of
statutory interpretation." REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 87 (1975). It follows that the law's purpose should be considered when interpreting

that law. CRAWFORD, supra, § 161, at 249; see DICKERSON, supra, at 88. In construing a
statute, this legislative purpose context is often the most important factor. DICKERSON, supra,
at 88; see also M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragments in Statutory
Interpretation,46 U. Prrr. L. R. 373, 391 (1985) (explaining that in the modem era, the court's
function has been to construe statutes in a manner that gives effect to congressional intent); see
generally73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 249 (1974) (presenting that courts should interpret a statute
so as to give the whole statute effect).
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purpose as intended by the legislature. °2 However, the Bennett Court's
interpretation of the citizen suit provision runs in opposition to the Endangered Species Act's environmental protection purpose because it permits
commercial interests to bring suit.'03
The next statutory principle that the Supreme Court failed to observe is
the "whole construction rule."" Following from the "legislative purpose"
rule above, the "whole construction rule" dictates that individual statutory
provisions should be construed in a manner that is consistent with the statute
as a whole. 5 Nevertheless, the Bennett Court deviated from this rule because
it construed the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision individually
and not pursuant to the Act as a whole. 6
In summary, the Bennett Court's decision has three main effects. First,
the Court "opened the floodgates" to litigation brought by commercial
interests claiming the Endangered Species Act over-regulates them. 0 7 Next,
the Court's holding will likely increase the amount of litigation brought under
other environmental laws containing analogous citizen suit provisions.0 "
Lastly, the Court frustrates the environmental purpose of the Endangered
Species Act by granting standing to commercial entities that claim the Act
over-regulates them."° Based upon such unsettling impacts, concerns
regarding the displaced role of environmental protection quickly arise.

102.

103.

See supra note 101 and accompanying text.

See Cain, supra note 95, at 3; see also Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162. For a more

detailed discussion of the Bennett holding, see supra pp. 562-65 and accompanying notes. For

a more detailed discussion of the Endangered Species Act's purpose, see supra note 94.
104.

See infra text accompanying note 105.

105. See CRAWFORD, supra note 101, § 165, at 258-59; see 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes §
254 (1974). This tenet of statutory construction may be analogized to reading a sentence
because just as it is necessary to read a sentence entirely in order to comprehend its true
meaning, it is similarly necessary to interpret the statute as a whole to interpret the meaning of
a single provision. See id. § 165, at 259. This principle is based upon both the way in which
humans communicate with each other and upon the basic limitations of language. See id. § 165,
at 260. The different phrases and clauses in statutory provisions depend on each other and
"[c]o-operatively, they convey the ultimate idea." Id. Hence, the court must interpret statutory
provisions collectively. Id. § 165, at 261. Keeping in mind the statute's purpose, the court must
attempt to make "every part effective, harmonious, and sensible." Id. See also id. § 166, at 262;
see generally Sinclair, supra note 101, at 400 (asserting that the maxim of relevance refers to
the relationship between the individual provision's purpose and the statute as a whole).
106. Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1167. The Court maintained that determining whether the
plaintiff's suit under the Administrative Procedure Act falls within the meaning of the zone of
interests test is done by reference to the particular statutory provision upon which the plaintiff
relies rather than by reference to the overall purpose of the Act. See id.
107. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 90, 92.
109. See supra pp. 565-68 and accompanying notes.
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III. RESTORATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
In light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Endangered Species
Act's citizen suit provision and the Court's conclusions that run contrary to
environmental protection," 0 restoring environmental protection as a national
priority becomes a necessary task. Among the possible alternatives to curb
some of the effects of Bennett.' that favor property and commercial interests
2
is a call for legislative action." Such an alternative involves lobbying
Congress to re-draft the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision and
re-define the meaning of "person" within that provision. Both options provide
equally effective means to effectuate a change that would limit the class of
persons who may bring suit under the Act's citizen suit provision and thereby
restore environmental protection as a national priority.
Currently, the Act's citizen suit provision provides that "any person may
'
commence a civil suit on his own behalf."" However, citizen suit provisions
of other environmental statutes use language that limits the class of persons
who may bring suit under them, such as: any person who is "alleged to be in
violation of this chapter,"" 4 or any person "having an interest which is or may
be adversely affected.""' The language of these latter statutes implicitly
implements the zone of interests prudential test"' within the statute itself
because it limits the class of persons who may bring suit under the citizen suit
provision to only those who are negatively affected. In this way, the zone of
these plaintiffs represent interests that the
interests test is given effect because
' 7
protect.
to
statute was designed
It follows that a call for legislative action would involve a demand for
changes in the wording of the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision
modeled after statutes that contain citizen suit provisions that limit the class
of plaintiffs. Hence, such a demand would involve a change from the Act's
110. See supra pp. 565-68 and accompanying notes.
111. 117S.Ct. 1154(1997).
112. See Cain, supra note 95, at 11. See also Rennie, supra note 95, at 398 (recognizing
that Congress holds the authority to place limits on potential plaintiffs that can assert standing
under the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision).
113. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g)(1) (West 1985).
114. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2619(a)(1) (West 1998).
115. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1270(a) (West 1986);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(g) (West 1986). See, e.g., supra note
68 (listing additional statutes cited by the Bennett Court that similarly contain citizen suit
provisions that limit the class of persons who may bring suit under such provisions).
116. See Camp, 397 U.S. at 153. For further discussion of the Camp decision and the
zone of interests test, see supra p. 558 and nn.30-34.
117. See Kathleen C. Becker, Bennett v. Plenert: EnvironmentalCitizen Suits and the
Zone of Interest Test, 26 ENVTL. L. 1071, 1086 (1996).
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current language allowing "any person" to bring suit"I8 to language allowing
"only persons alleged to be in violation of the Act" or "only
persons adversely
affected by a violation of this Act" to bring suit. In this way, the zone of
interests test that the judiciary negated 9 in Bennett120 is re-instated by the

legislature. In order to promote environmental protection consistently, it may

be necessary to make these recommended legislative changes to other
environmental laws containing similarly worded citizen suit provisions. 2 1
From a legislative approach, another alternative to limit Bennett's2'
impact is a change in the definition of "person" within the Endangered Species
Act's citizen suit provision. At present, the Act provides that "person"
includes an individual, business organization, or representative of any state,
federal, or foreign government. 23 As a result, this definition of "person" used
in the citizen suit provision permits anyone to bring a cause of action under
the Act 24 as demonstrated by Bennett.2 5 However, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act 126 serves as a model for change because its definition of
"citizen" under its citizen suit provision 27 limits potential plaintiffs
to only
those persons "having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.' 28
Consequently, a call for legislative action regarding the Endangered
Species Act's citizen suit provision would similarly involve a demand for a
118. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g)(1) (West 1985).
119. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
120. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
121. See Hansen, supra note 89, at 22; Smith, supra note 86, at 3; Greenhouse, supra
note 89, at A10; U.S. Supreme Court May Have Difficult Time Ruling in Bennett v. Spear, supra
note 90. See e.g., Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8(a) (West 1991 & Supp.
1998); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(a) (West 1995); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 7604(a) (West 1995); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659(a) (West 1995); Emergency Planning and Community Right-

to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11046(a)(1) (West 1995).
122. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
123. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(13) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998). The Endangered Species Act's
definition of "person" in its entirety reads as follows: "The term 'person' means an individual,
corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity; or any officer, employee,
agent, department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or
political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any State, municipality, or
political subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States." Id.
124. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
125. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
126. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998).
127. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1998).
128. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(g) (West 1986). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act's
entire definition of "citizen" under its citizen suit provision reads as follows: "For the purposes
of this section the term 'citizen' means a person or persons having an interest which is or may
be adversely affected." Id.
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'1 29
Such a demand would entail a
change in the Act's definition of "person."

change from the current, all-inclusive definition to one that is more selective
and limits the class of persons who may bring suit. Thus, using the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act 130 as a model, a proposed new definition of
"person" under the Endangered Species Act might be: "For the purposes of
this provision the term 'person' means only those having an interest that is or
may be adversely affected." Again, such a draft legislatively institutes the
zone of interests test within the environmental statute because it limits
potential plaintiffs to only those representing interests the Act was designed
to protect. More importantly, this improved definition thereby avoids judicial
contrary to the environmental
negation of the zone of interests test that runs
3
'
protection purpose of environmental laws.'
The final recommendation regarding this legislative action strategy
32
designed to curb the effects of Bennett1 involves re-addressing the constitutionality of citizen suit provisions. Such discussion may raise Congressional
awareness of the counter-productive aspects of poorly worded citizen suit
provisions that permit those outside a statute's zone of interests to file suit.
Such an awareness may lead to improved drafting of citizen suit provisions in
new legislation. Moreover, such awareness may also support the call for
legislative re-drafting of existing citizen suit provisions.
Citizen suit provisions raise serious issues'with respect to separation of
M
powers 33 between the three branches of government." Two main challenges
129. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g) (West 1994). See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(13) (West 1985 &
Supp. 1998).
130. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998).
131. See supra pp. 565-68 and accompanying notes.
132. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
133. The concept of separation of powers was established in the United States
Constitution. The Constitution states that federal power will be divided among the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. Congress is granted "[a]ll legislative Powers." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 1. The President is granted executive power. Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Finally, the
"judicial Power of the United States" is vested in "one supreme Court, and in such inferior
courts" that Congress finds necessary to establish. Id. at art. III, § 1. The purpose of the
separation of powers doctrine is to safeguard against oppression by the federal government.
Charles S. Abell, Ignoring the Trees for the Forests: How the Citizen Suit Provision of the
Clean Water Act Violates the Constitution'sSeparationof Powers Principle,81 VA. L. REV.
1957, 1987 (1995).
134. Abell, supra note 133, at 1957. See Peter A. Alpert, Citizen Suits Under the Clean
Air Act: UniversalStandingfor the Uninjured PrivateAttorney General, 16 B.C. ENVTL AFF.
L. REV. 283, 285 (1988). See generally Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an
Essential Element of the Separationof Powers, 17 SuFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 890-93 (1983)
(advancing that standing is ultimately related to concerns about separation of powers). Citizen
suit provisions give rise to concerns particularly regarding legislative infringement upon both
the separation of powers and the power of citizens to prosecute with proper authority. Id. See
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to the constitutionality of citizen suit provisions exist.135 The first challenge
is that permitting citizens to enforce laws via citizen suit provisions undermines the President's duty to execute the country's laws because it takes
power away from the Executive branch. 136
The second constitutional challenge to citizen suit provisions is that they
violate the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution that allows
the President to appoint officers. 37 By conferring upon citizens the power to
act as officers and enforce federal laws, Congress takes for itself this
presidential power to appoint officers.13 1 In this way, the legislative branch
violates the separation of powers doctrine because it aggrandizes its power by
39
seizing an executive duty.
While Bennett 40 may be the first step in a judicial trend to limit the
application of environmental laws, alternatives exist to preserve the importance of environmental protection. 4 ' Among the strategies are legislative
calls to both re-draft citizen suit provisions and re-define the meaning of
"person" in order to confine potential plaintiffs to only those falling
within the
statute's zone of interests.'42 Another alternative is to re-address the
constitutionality of citizen suit provisions in an effort to raise Congressional
awareness of problems that such poorly worded provisions generate. 143
Whether individually or collectively, the implementation of these strategy
generally Scalia, supra,at 893-94 n.58 (asserting that Congressional expansion of standing does
not justify a judicial disregard of boundaries between branches of government).
135. Abell, supra note 133, at 1966-67.
136. Id. at 1966-68. The Constitution states that the President "shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3. According to the Supreme Court, the Executive Branch must retain primary

control over its administration of the laws. Abell, supra note 133, at 1968. Granting to private
citizens the power to enforce laws effectively impairs "the Executive authority by removing
prosecutorial discretion and control from the President." Id. at 1967.
137. Abell, supra note 133, at 1973. The Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution
states in relevant part that the President "shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law .... U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. It follows that because this power was granted to the
President, this clause implicitly prohibits the legislative taking of it. Abell, supra note 133, at
1973.
138. Abell, supra note 133, at 1975. The Supreme Court has not exempted private
citizens from the boundaries of the Appointments Clause. Id. Hence by enforcing federal laws,
these citizens are exercising an executive function without being properly appointed. See id.
139. Abell, supra note 133, at 1974-75. By conferring executive authority to citizens,
Congress appropriates to itself a power that is exclusively vested in the President. Id. at 1975.
140.

117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).

141. See Feldman, supra note 88, at 23.
142. See supra pp. 569-71 and accompanying notes.
143. See supra pp. 571-72 and accompanying notes.
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alternatives is imperative to restore conservation as an irrefutable priority, not
only for our Nation, but for our planet as well.
CONCLUSION

In Bennett v. Spear,"4 the Supreme Court reviewed whether the zone of
interests test applied to the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision. 45
By negating the zone of interests test under the provision, 14 6 the Supreme
Court ruled for the first time in its history that everyone had rights to use the

provision. 47
The Bennett decision fails to uphold the conservationist purpose of not
only the Endangered Species Act, but also the purposes of other environmental laws containing analogous provisions. Humanity stands at the intersection

between the comforts of industrial advancement and the absolute necessity of
a healthy planet. As industrial damage to the environment increases, the need
for environmental protection is greater than ever.'48 While nature provides
aesthetic and recreational pleasures, its true hidden treasures are those that it
holds for scientific and medical advancement.'4 9 It follows that we must
persistently labor to preserve the Earth. 50 Unfortunately, Bennett',

144. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
145. Id. at 1160.
146. Id. at 1162.
147. Smith, supra note 86, at 1; see also Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
148. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
149. Congress noted that among the reasons fish, wildlife, and plants are valued by the
Nation is for their aesthetic, recreational, and scientific value. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (a)(3) (West
1985). Deforestation and other human activities lead to the extinction of plants and animals that
fuel "a corresponding reduction in the planet's genetic stockpile." Hampson, supra note 2, at
13. Moreover, in the United States a large number of medications are plant-based and animalbased. Erin B. Newman, Earth's Vanishing Medicine Cabinet:Rain Forest Destructionand
Its Impact on the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 479 (1994). Hence, the
destruction of the planet's plants and animals results in a decrease in the global biological
diversity that aids in medical research. Id. at 479-80. In fact, human activities in the last
twenty-five years of this century have reduced biological diversity "'at a rate that may be
unprecedented in the history of life on Earth,' a rate as fast as at any time since the dinosaurs
became extinct over 65 million years ago." Id. at 487 (quoting Paul Roberts, International
Fundingfor the Conservation ofBiological Diversity: Convention on BiologicalDiversity, 10
B.U. INT'LL.J. 303, 308 (1992)). As an unknown number of species succumb to extinction, the
possibility of finding cures for diseases like cancer, AIDS, and other incurable diseases,
similarly lessens. Id. at 480-84.
150. Cf. Hampson, supra note 2, at 13 (declaring that a global response to environmental
changes should be set at the beginning of international discussions); Speth, supra note 2, at 413
(asserting that a technological revolution is necessary to prevent humans from destroying the
planet).
151. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
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effectively blurs the conservationist purpose of environmental laws and steers
the focus away from environmental protection.
PREETI S. CHAUDHARI

